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Abstract 
The study examines the role of governance in modulating the effect of capital flight on 
industrialisation in Africa. The empirical evidence is based on Generalised Method of 
Moments and governance is bundled by principal component analysis, namely: (i) political 
governance from political stability and “voice and accountability”; (ii) economic governance 
from government effectiveness and regulation quality; and (iii) institutional governance from 
corruption-control and the rule of law. First, governance increases industrialisation whereas 
capital flight has the opposite effect; and second, governance does not significantly mitigate 
the negative effect of capital flight on industrialisation. Policy implications are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This study examines the role of governance in modulating the effect of capital flight on 
industrialisation in African countries. It is motivated by three main factors, namely: the: (i) 
growing trend of capital flight in Africa; (ii) relevance of governance in dampening negative 
macroeconomic signals such as capital flight; and (iii) lagging position of Africa in 
industrialisation2.  
 Firstly, as documented by Boyce and Ndikumana (2012) who have provided an 
update on estimates of capital flight, over the past decades Africa has experienced 
substantial capital outflows. For example, approximately 814 billion US Dollars (in constant 
of 2010 US Dollars) was lost by 33 sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries during the period 
1970-2010. The lost sum to capital flight is higher than foreign direct investment and foreign 
aid which during the same period stood at respectively 306 billion and 659 billion US 
Dollars. This mismatch is important because lack of finance has been established to be a 
principal constraint to the development of the continent (Adu & Asamoah, 2016; Charles & 
Mori, 2016; Nyasha & Odhiambo, 2017; Amponsah, 2017; Danquah et al., 2017; Asongu & 
Odhiambo, 2019a).  
 Secondly, good governance has been documented to, inter alia: improve the efficient 
allocation of resources (Fonchingong, 2014), consolidate the foundations of social change 
(Efobi, 2015), decrease capital flight (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017) and boost 
industrialisation (Nobuyuki, 2010). Hence, this study is particularly relevant in the light of   
Africa’s lagging position in industrialisation.  
 Thirdly, compared to other world regions, Africa is substantially lagging in terms of 
industrialisation. The comparatively slow progress towards industrialisation in the continent 
has been traceable to a number of factors, including: (i) poor skills, infrastructure and 
                                                          
2In this study, we are not assessing the role of a policy variable (e.g. governance) in modulating the effect of 
another policy variable (such as domestic investment) on industrialisation. On the contrary, we are assessing the 
role of a policy variable (e.g. governance) in modulating the effect of a policy syndrome (such as capital flight) 
on industrialisation. We are aware of the fact that the channel of domestic investment could lead to more 
feasible results. However, consistent with the motivation of the study, we are concerned about capital flight as a 
policy syndrome. Nonetheless, we have considered domestic investment as a potential channel in a robustness 
check and could not establish significant and feasible results.  
The concept of governance used in the study is not specifically tied to industrial governance. Good governance 
indicators from the World Bank affect both capital flight and doing business conditions that are potentially 
positive for industrialisation. Hence, we are not concerned about industrial channels through which governance 
can mitigate the negative impact of capital flight on industrialisation. Nine main good governance channels are 
explored in the study. These include:  political stability, “voice & accountability”, political governance, 
government effectiveness, regulation quality, economic governance, corruption-control, rule of law and 
institutional governance. 
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investment climate (Page, 2012; Gui-Diby & Renard, 2015) and (ii) shortage of the 
investment capital required to fund the industrialisation process (Tuomi, 2011; Darley, 2012; 
Tibebe & Mollick, 2017; Nukpezah & Blankson, 2017; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2020; Asongu 
et al., 2019).   
As far as we have reviewed, there is currently no study that has investigated how 
governance modulates the effect of capital flight on industrialisation. Hence, the positioning 
of this study departs from the broader contemporary literature on capital flight in Africa. The 
strand of the literature closest to this positioning has established capital flight to originate 
from poor governance (Christensen, 2011; Gankou et al., 2016; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 
2017). Moreover, while there is a substantial body of literature on governance (Musila & 
Sigué, 2010; Kangoye, 2013) and capital flight (Ndiaye & Siri, 2016; Mpenya et al., 2016; 
Asongu & Amankwah-Amoah, 2018) in Africa, we know very little about how governance 
modulates the effect of capital flight on macroeconomic outcomes. We improve the extant 
literature by focusing on industrialisation as a macroeconomic outcome owing to the growing 
relevance of African industrialisation in policy and academic circles (Asche & Grimm, 2017; 
Tchamyou, 2017; Diao et al., 2017; Ssozi et al., 2019). To make this assessment, governance 
indicators are bundled and unbundled. The motivation for bundling governance indicators 
builds on evolving paradigms in the conception, definition and measurement of governance 
(Asongu, 2016). For example, it is inappropriate to employ the term “political governance” 
unless the variable underlying the term is a composite measurement of “voice and 
accountability” and “political stability/non-violence”.  
The positioning of the research also departs from contemporary African development 
literature which has largely focused on, inter alia: nexuses between finance, remittances and 
industrialisation (Efobi et al., 2019); remittances, the diffusion of information and 
industrialisation (Asongu & Odhiambo, 2020);  the importance of governance in development 
outcomes (Pelizzo & Nwokora, 2016, 2018; Pelizzo et al., 2016); linkages between trade and 
industrialisation (Kaplinsky & Morris, 2019; Oloruntoba & Tsowou, 2019); green 
industrialisation (Okereke et al., 2019) and financial reforms as drivers of  industrialisation 
(Folarin, 2019). The rest of the study is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the 
theoretical underpinnings and testable hypotheses. The data and methodology are covered in 
section 3, while section 4 presents the empirical results and discussion. Section 5 concludes 
with future research directions.  
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2. Intuitions and testable hypotheses  
 Consistent with Naude et al. (2013) and Efobi et al. (2019), industrialisation can be 
defined as a socio-economic process of quick transformation within the manufacturing 
sector in relation to a plethora of avenues of production and work done within an economy. 
It is important to note that the underlying definition builds on information from the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). It encompasses the added 
value of the manufacturing sector when the overall size of the economy is considered. In 
accordance with Gui-Diby and Renard (2015), when the level of development in the 
manufacturing sector is comparatively high with regard to other sectors within an economy, 
the industrialisation rate in the country is also relatively high. With insights into these 
definitions provided, two dimensions are essential for the consolidation of the 
industrialisation process, notably: (i) the provision of incentives of production to the 
manufacturing sector; and (ii) the sustainability of production in order to meet requirements 
at the local and international levels.  
 Having clarified the conception and definition of industrialisation, in the sections that 
follow, we discuss how linkages between various aspects of governance and capital flight 
affect industrialisation. In so doing, the related notions of governance and capital flight are 
elucidated correspondingly. Political governance, economic governance and institutional 
governance are discussed in the first, second and third strands, respectively. 
 First, political governance can be defined as the election and replacement of political 
leaders (Andrés et al., 2015). According to recent literature (Collier et al., 2004; Davies, 
2008; Ndikumana et al., 2015; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017), the political environment has 
a substantial influence on capital flight because it is related to the damage/loss of assets. 
Accordingly, in the presence of political instability and violence, it is very likely that 
investors transfer their capital to economic environments that are associated with lower 
levels of investment risks. Furthermore, if investors think that national political institutions 
(e.g. competitive elections and executive accountability) are not favourable for economic 
performance, it is very probable that they would transfer their investments to other nations 
where political institutions are more stable and credible. A number of political features 
related to the performance of international markets and security of claims are contingent on 
international ownership (Lensink et al., 2000; Le & Zak, 2006).  For example, with respect 
to foreign direct investment (FDI), assets are controlled or owned by investors in a receiving 
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nation and long-term investment and economic growth could be negatively affected by 
political risk.  
 In the light of the above, investors naturally react negatively to political events that, 
according to them, are unfavourable to their returns. A channel of reaction by such investors 
is disinvesting. Therefore, direct effects of political characteristics such as political 
instability, democracy and accountability influence the amount of capital that transits within a 
country. Consequently, unaccountable executives can produce unpredictable investment-
related policies which ultimately influence capital flight. Hence, political stability and non-
violence can mitigate the potentially negative effect of capital flight on industrialisation.      
Second, economic governance is the formulation and implementation of policies that deliver 
public commodities (Andrés et al., 2015). In this strand, fragile economic governance could 
result in an economic outlook that is uncertain. This uncertain economic outlook discourages 
investors from placing their assets in the economies concerned. This intuition builds on the 
evidence that investors prefer economic climates that are associated with less uncertainty 
(Kelsey & le Roux, 2017, 2018). From common sense, bad economic governance can 
produce substantial economic damages which affect the concerns of investors, especially with 
regard to the valuation of assets and confidence in the economic outlook. Therefore, from the 
perspective of investors, assets and money can more easily leave a nation in situations of poor 
economic governance. Hence, bad economic governance can reduce macroeconomic 
performance and discourage capital flows owing to a blurred economic outlook. This is even 
more apparent when policies designed to deliver public goods and services are tailored by the 
elite such that they masterfully siphon and deposit stolen funds in tax havens. It follows from 
the underlying arguments that good economic governance can stifle capital flight that inhibits 
the process of industrialisation.  
 In the third strand, institutional governance can be understood as the respect of the 
State and citizens of institutions that govern interactions between them. On the nexus 
between capital flight and institutional governance, we argue that the rule of law and 
corruption-control affect the confidence of investors within an economy on the one hand, and 
on the other hand, the ability of officials in government to create mechanisms that siphon and 
deposit funds in tax havens. In essence, investors are more likely to invest in economies in 
which the respect of the rule of law is optimal for investment. In clearer perspective, 
investors are likely to invest if, according to them, the overall economic performance of an 
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economy cannot be weakened with State predation, regardless of whether such investors are 
directly influenced by such predation. The fact that investors prefer environments with more 
information accounting standards (La Porta et al., 1998), more efficient courts (Djankov et 
al., 2003) and better institutions with less corrupt governments (La Porta et al., 1999), has 
been confirmed in recent African institutional literature (Asongu, 2012; Fowowe, 2014; 
Muazu & Alagidede, 2017). Against the backdrop of these empirical arguments, the rule of 
law enables better protection of property rights and also guarantees foreign investors against 
expropriation of their invested assets. Such expropriation encourages capital flight and 
decreases foreign investment needed for the industrialisation process. This logic is more 
apparent when countries with corrupt executives are not fully committed to respecting 
investors’ ownership rights.  
 In the light of the above arguments, the following three testable hypotheses are 
assessed within the empirical framework. 
Hypothesis 1: Governance positively affects industrialisation. 
Hypothesis 2: Capital flight negatively affects industrialisation. 
Hypothesis 3: The negative effect of capital flight can be dampened by the positive effect of 
governance on industrialisation. 
 It is important to note that the first two hypotheses are expected to be valid because 
they reflect assumptions underlying the third hypothesis, which is the main hypothesis of the 
study. In other words, Hypothesis 3 has two underpinning assumptions that should be 
validated by two prior hypotheses. 
3. Data and methodology  
3.1 Data  
This paper investigates a panel of 36 African countries with data from 1996 to 20103. The 
three main sources of the data are: World Bank Governance indicators for governance 
variables; a capital flight indicator from Boyce and Ndikumana (2012), and macroeconomic 
                                                          
3The sampled thirty-six countries are: Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape 
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tunisia, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
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indicators from African Development Indicators of the World Bank.  The sampled countries 
and selected periodicity are constrained by data availability issues. Accordingly, the capital 
flight measurement ends in the year 2010 while good governance indicators are only 
available from the year 1996.  
 Consistent with recent literature, the adopted outcome indicator, which is 
industrialisation, is measured as the manufacturing added value at constant price as a 
percentage of GDP (see Efobi et al., 2019). This indicator of industrialisation is consistent 
with the International Standard Industrial Classification (Section D). The measurement 
proxies for productive manufacturing are units that are classified in relation to the type of 
principal activity, which embodies activities that are: (i) manually done (including 
household work) or (ii) done with the help of machinery that is power-tailored and factor-
oriented (United Nations, 1990). Furthermore, the suggested indicator for industrialisation 
has been preferred in recent literature (Kang & Lee, 2011; UNIDO, 2013; Gui-Diby & 
Renard, 2015).   
 In accordance with recent studies (Weeks, 2015; Efobi & Asongu, 2016), capital 
flight, which is the main independent variable of interest, reflects unrecorded capital flows 
between a country and the rest of the world. The appreciation of such flows starts from 
inflows in foreign exchange that are acknowledged in a country’s balance of payments, such 
that the amount of currency that is missing is presented in terms of “net errors and 
omissions”. Such missing currency is also known as the disparity between recorded inflows 
and unrecorded outflows.  
 The main drawback in the indicator of capital flight is that it is not directly 
comparable with other indicators, given that it is presented in terms of constant 2010 US 
Dollars. Consistent with Asongu (2014a), the issue can be addressed in three steps. We first 
transform the current GDP into constant 2010 terms. Then, we divide the corresponding 
value by 1 000 000 to obtain a “GDP constant of 2010 USD (in millions)”. Finally, we 
divide the capital flight data by the “GDP constant of 2010 USD (in millions)”. Ultimately, 
as shown in Appendix 2, a capital flight measurement that is comparable with other 
indicators is obtained. 
 The six policy explanatory governance indicators from Kaufmann et al. (2010) are 
bundled in section 3.1 through principal component analysis (PCA).  The bundling exercise 
produces: (i) political governance (composed of political stability/non violence and “voice & 
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accountability”); (ii) economic governance (consisting of government effectiveness and 
regulation quality) and (iii) institutional governance (an embodiment of corruption-control 
and the rule of law). The six unbundled governnce indicators from Kaufmann et al. (2010) 
have been used  in recent  governance literature (Gani, 2011; Andrés & Asongu, 2013;  
Yerrabati & Hawkes, 2015; Andrés et al., 2015; Oluwatobi et al., 2015; Ajide & Raheem, 
2016a, 2016b; Asongu & Nnanna, 2019; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2019b). 
 In order to control for omitted variable bias, five control variables are adopted, 
namely: trade openness; gross fixed capital formation or domestic investment, population 
growth, financial allocation efficiency and domestic credit to the private sector. While from 
intuition, positive relationships could be expected between industrialisation in the selected 
control variables, in reality however, the expected signs are contingent on market dynamism 
and expansion. For instance, if domestic investment is more related to education, health and 
social amenities, the direct impact on industrialisation may not be so apparent. Moreover, the 
shift of such domestic investment from the productive sector could negatively impact the 
industrialisation process. It is also important to note that a positive demographic change may 
not have a positive effect on industrialisation if the incremental demand from the population 
is for foreign commodities.  Moreover, the incidence of financial development depends on 
the capacity of financial institutions to transform mobilised deposits into credit for economic 
operators. Accordingly, surplus liquidity issues which have been substantially documented in 
African financial institutions (Saxegaard, 2006; Asongu, 2014b) may translate into the 
underlying financial development indicators influencing industrialisation negatively. This is 
essentially because economic operators do not have access to credit for investment purposes.   
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
 This study employs PCA for the purpose of bundling the governance indicators 
obtained from Kaufmann et al. (2010) into three main composite indicators, namely: 
economic, institutional and political governance. Such an approach to bundling governance is 
consistent with recent literature on African governance (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a). The 
technique consists of reducing a set of highly correlated variables into an uncorrelated set of 
small indicators known as principal components (PCs).  The corresponding PCs reflect a 
substantial variation in information from the original dataset.   
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 Within the PCA empirical framework, the six governance indicators are reduced into 
institutional governance, economic governance and political governance. (i) Political 
governance (consisting of voice & accountability and political stability) is the election and 
replacement of political leaders. (ii) Economic governance (a composition of regulation 
quality and government effectiveness) is the formulation and implementation of policies that 
deliver public commodities. (iii) Institutional governance (encompassing the rule of law and 
corruption-control) is the respect by citizens and the State of institutions that govern 
interactions between them.  
 The criterion for selecting the PCs is from Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002). 
According to the authors, only common factors reflecting eigenvalues higher than one or the 
mean should be retained. The findings for the PCA are presented in Table 1. The following 
can be retained in the light of the information criterion: (i) political governance (Polgov) 
which reflects about 83.50% of information from political stability and “voice and 
accountability” has an eigenvalue of 1.671; (ii) economic governance (Ecogov) which 
represents about 93.90% of information from regulation quality and government 
effectiveness has an eigenvalue of 1.878 and (iii) institutional governance (Instgov) which 
reflects approximately about 93.00% of variation in the rule of law and corruption-control has 
an eigenvalue of 1.861.  
Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Composite Governance  
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix(Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen-
value 
 VA PS RQ GE RL CC    
          
First PC (Polgov) 0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.835 0.835 1.671 
Second PC -0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.164 1.000 0.328 
          
First PC (Ecogov) --- --- 0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.939 0.939 1.878 
Second PC --- --- -0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.060 1.000 0.121 
          
First PC (Instgov) --- --- --- --- 0.707 0.707 0.930 0.930 1.861 
Second PC --- --- --- --- -0.707 0.707 0.069 1.000 0.138 
          
P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: 
Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. G.Gov (General Governance): First PC of VA, PS, RQ, GE, RL & CC. Polgov (Political 
Governance): First PC of VA & PS. Ecogov (Economic Governance): First PC of RQ & GE. Instgov (Institutional Governance): First PC of 
RL & CC.  
 
 It is relevant to briefly discuss some critical concerns that may arise in regressors that 
are derived from initial regressions. As recently shown by Asongu and Nwachukwu (2017) 
and Asongu et al. (2018), the concerns are linked to the efficiency and consistency of 
estimates on the one hand, and the validity of related inferences, on the other hand. In line 
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with Pagan (1984), while two-step estimators are efficient and consistent, only few valid 
inferences can be apparent.  This inferential caution is consistent with a recent strand of 
literature, notably: Oxley and McAleer (1993); McKenzie and McAleer (1997); Ba and Ng 
(2006), and Westerlund and Urbain (2013a). 
 The underlying concerns about inferential validity have been substantially engaged by  
Westerlund and Urbain (2012, 2013b), who have documented an interesting literature on 
concerns related to the inferential quality of PCA-augmented regressors. Building on a strand 
of past studies related to the concerns (Pesaran, 2006; Stock & Watson, 2002; Bai, 2003; Bai, 
2009; Greenaway-McGrevy et al., 2012), the authors have established that it is possible to 
obtain normal inferences with PC-derived regressors, in so far as corresponding estimated 
parameters converge to their real values at the rate of NT , (with T denoting the number of 
time series and N reflecting cross-section observations).  The authors have further articulated 
that, for the suggested convergence to occur, T and N have to be sufficiently large. 
Unfortunately, how “large should be large” is not defined. With regards to the specific 
context of this study, two major issues confront us. N cannot be further increased because we 
cannot stretch the dataset beyond the 36 countries given data availability constraints. 
Moreover, T can only be situated between 1996 and 2010 because of two main reasons, 
notably: the capital flight data in our possession ends in 2010 and good governance indicators 
are only available from 1996. In summary, valid inferences are feasible because we have used 
the maximum values of T and N available at the time of the study.  
3.2.2 Estimation technique 
 Five main motivations underline the choice of a Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) as empirical strategy. While the first-two are requirements for the use of the 
technique, the last-three are advantages associated with the empirical strategy. (i) The 
empirical strategy enables the control for persistence in industrialisation. This behaviour is 
apparent in the dependent variable because the correlation between industrialisation and its 
first lag (i.e. 0.961) is higher than the rule of thumb threshold of 0.800 needed to ascertain 
persistence in a dependent variable. (ii) The T(or 5)<N(or 36) criterion for the employment of 
the GMM estimation approach is met,  given that the number of time series in each cross- 
section is lower than the number of cross-sections. (iii) The approach to estimation accounts 
for endogeneity in all the regressors because, on the one hand, simultaneity is controlled 
using instrumented variables and on the other hand, there is some bite on the unobserved 
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heterogeneity with the use of time invariant indicators. (iv) Biases that are related to the 
difference GMM strategy are addressed with the system GMM empirical approach. (v) Given 
the panel-oriented nature of the empirical approach, cross-country variations are considered.  
 It is in the light of the fifth reason above that the system GMM estimator of Blundell 
and Bond (1998) and Arellano and Bover (1995) have been documented by Bond et al. 
(2001) to reflect better properties of efficiency, relative to the difference estimator (from 
Arellano & Bond, 1991). The adopted approach of this study is the Roodman (2009a, 2009b) 
extension of Arellano and Bover (1995). This approach is based on forward orthogonal 
deviations instead of first differences. This extension has better properties because it has been 
established to limit instrument proliferation and/or avoid over-identification (see Baltagi, 
2008; Love & Zicchino, 2006; Boateng et al., 2018; Tchamyou et al., 2019a, 2019b). A two-
step specification is chosen because it controls for heteroscedasticity. Accordingly, the one-
step approach is consistent with homoscedasticity.  
The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarise the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure. In the modelling exercise, capital flight is specified to be 
one lag non-contemporary.  
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where, tiInd , is industrialisation of country i at  period t ; tiInd , is industrialisation of country 
i at  period t ; tiCap , is capital flight of country i at  period t ; tiGov , is governance 
(political, economic, and institutional) of country i at  period t ; 0  is a constant;  represents 
the coefficient of auto-regression; W  is the vector of control variables  (trade openness, 
domestic investment, population, bank efficiency and domestic credit), i
 
is the country-
specific effect, t
 
is the time-specific constant  and ti ,  the error term. 
 In accordance with Brambor et al. (2006) and Tchamyou (2019a, 2019b), in 
interactive specifications, all constitutive terms should be incorporated regardless of the 
concern of multicollinearity. An interactive framework is also consistent with the main 
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purpose of this study, notably: an assessment of the role of governance in modulating the 
effect of capital flight on industrialisation. In the assessment, the net effect of capital flight on 
industrialisation is the sum of the unconditional effect of capital flight and the conditional 
effect of capital flight (i.e. from the interaction between governance and capital flight).   
 
3.2.3 Identification, simultaneity and exclusion restrictions 
Discussing identification, simultaneity and exclusion restrictions is relevant for a robust 
GMM specification. From the perspective of identification, all explanatory indicators are 
predetermined or suspected endogenous and exclusively time-invariant variables are 
considered to exhibit strict exogeneity. A similar approach has been adopted in recent 
empirical literature (Dewan & Ramaprasad, 2014; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b; Tchamyou 
& Asongu, 2017). The intuition for this identification strategy is that it is very unlikely for 
time-invariant omitted indicators to reflect endogeneity in first difference (see Roodman, 
2009b)4.  
 With respect to simultaneity, lagged regressors are used as instruments for forward 
differenced indicators. Hence, Helmet transformations are also employed on the regressors in 
order to purge fixed effects that could influence the investigated relationships (Arellano & 
Bover, 1995; Love & Zicchino, 2006). The underlying transformations encompass the 
employment of forward averaged-differencing of the variables, which is different from the 
process of deducting non-contemporary observations from contemporary observations (see 
Roodman, 2009b, p. 104). Such transformations enable parallel or orthogonal conditions 
between lagged values and forward-differenced indicators. Regardless of lag numbers, the 
loss of data is minimised by computing the suggested transformation for all observations with 
the exception of the last observation in cross sections: “And because lagged observations do 
not enter the formula, they are valid as instruments” (Roodman, 2009b, p. 104). 
 From the perspective of exclusion restrictions, the adopted time-invariant indicators 
that are considered as strictly exogenous affect the outcome variable or industrialisation 
exclusively via the predetermined or suspected endogenous indicators. Furthermore, the 
statistical relevance of the exclusion restriction is assessed with the Difference in Hansen 
Test (DHT) for the validity of instruments. Accordingly, in order for the time-invariant 
indicators to elicit industrialisation exclusively via the predetermined indicators, the 
                                                          
4Therefore, the approach for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv(years, eq(diff))’ while the gmmstyle is used  for 
suspected endogenous  variables. 
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alternative hypothesis of the test should be rejected5. With the current GMM approach, the 
information criterion used to examine if time-invariant variables exhibit strict exogeneity is 
the DHT. Hence, given the above clarification, in the findings that are reported in the next 
section, the assumption of exclusion restriction is validated if the alternative hypothesis of the 
DHT associated with IV(year, eq(diff)) is rejected. 
 
4. Empirical results  
4.1 Presentation of results  
Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4 disclose results respectively, corresponding to political 
governance, economic governance and institutional governance. Four principal information 
criteria are employed to examine the validity of the GMM model with forward orthogonal 
deviations6. Based on the criteria, all the estimated models are valid. Three main dimensions 
are considered when assessing the investigated hypotheses, notably: (i) Hypothesis 1 and 
Hypothesis 2 are assessed respectively with the estimated unconditional effect of governance 
and capital flight whereas (ii) Hypothesis 3 is examined using the net effect of the role of 
governance in dampening the unconditional effect of capital flight on industrialisation. 
Hence, the computed net effects of capital flight involve both underlying unconditional and 
conditional effects of capital flight. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5It is relevant to note that in a standard Instrumental Variable (IV) approach, failure to reject the null hypothesis 
of the Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test indicates that the instruments do not elucidate the 
dependent variable beyond suspected endogenous variables (see Beck et al., 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 
2016c).  
6“First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for the absence 
of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen overidentification restrictions 
(OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not 
correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the 
Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to restrict identification or limit the proliferation of 
instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the 
Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results from the 
Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 
2017, p.200) 
15 
 
Table 2: Political governance, capital flight and industrialisation  
       
 Dependent variable: Industrialisation 
       
 Political Stability  Voice & Accountability  Political Governance  
       
Industrialisation(-1) 0.875*** 0.844*** 0.878*** 0.910*** 0.870*** 0.927*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 2.395 9.548*** 8.943 4.925 1.771 7.986*** 
 (0.370) (0.000) (0.121) (0.122) (0.423) (0.000) 
Political Stability (PS) 1.578 5.158*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.315) (0.000)     
Voice & Accountability (VA) --- --- 8.995* 6.021 --- --- 
   (0.095) (0.114)   
Political Governance (Polgov) --- --- --- --- 1.632 6.684*** 
     (0.243) (0.000) 
Capital Flight (-1)(CapFlight) -0.064 -0.770*** -0.716 -0.384 -0.046 -0.773*** 
 (0.776) (0.002) (0.231) (0.261) (0.844) (0.000) 
PolS ×CapFlight -0.164 -0.605*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.274) (0.000)     
VA× CapFlight --- --- -0.941* -0.720* --- --- 
   (0.051) (0.065)   
Polgov× CapFlight --- --- --- --- -0.182 -0.762*** 
     (0.203) (0.000) 
Trade  -0.001 0.001 -0.004 0.004 0.007 0.008 
 (0.895) (0.847) (0.670) (0.215) (0.561) (0.286) 
Domestic Investment  -0.020** -0.026*** -0.019 -0.013** -0.020 -0.017** 
 (0.020) (0.005) (0.186) (0.022) (0.107) (0.047) 
Population   --- -0.020*** --- -0.010** --- -0.009* 
  (0.000)  (0.040)  (0.052) 
Bank Efficiency --- -0.029*** --- -0.031*** --- -0.027*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Private credit  --- 0.119*** --- 0.086*** --- 0.124*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Net Effects of Capital Flight na -0.376 na na na -0.698 
       
AR(1) (0.270) (0.087) (0.268) (0.080) (0.268) (0.076) 
AR(2) (0.292) (0.167) (0.291) (0.274) (0.290) (0.167) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Hansen OIR (0.501) (0.487) (0.308) (0.558) (0.475) (0.359) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels (0.251) (0.771) (0.782) (0.478) (0.472) (0.975) 
H excluding group (0.648) (0.290) (0.148) (0.539) (0.433) (0.100) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous)       
(b) IV (years, eq(diff)) (0.535) (0.166) (0.172) (0.412) (0.567) (0.210) 
H excluding group (0.331) (1.000) (0.884) (0.914) (0.245) (1.000) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous)       
       
Fisher  437.17*** 1542.15*** 123.47*** 1126.33*** 335.04*** 1092.53*** 
Instruments  26 38 26 38 26 38 
Countries  35 35 35 35 35 35 
Observations  323 307 323 307 323 307 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure 
to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and 
Hansen OIR tests. The mean values of political stability, voice & accountability and political governance are respectively -0.650, -0.705 and 
-0.098. It is important to note that whereas the sample consists of 36 African countries, 35 countries may appear in the regression output 
because of issues in degrees of freedom associated with some variables used in the conditioning information set. na: not applicable because 
at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is not significant. 
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Table 3: Economic governance, capital flight and industrialisation 
       
 Dependent variable: Industrialisation 
       
 Regulation Quality   Government Effectiveness  Economic Governance  
       
Industrialisation(-1) 0.838*** 0.929*** 0.629*** 0.918*** 0.845*** 0.908*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 2.943 2.024 38.618*** 8.083*** 1.812 5.121** 
 (0.482) (0.473) (0.000) (0.008) (0.642) (0.018) 
Regulation Quality  (RG) 0.841 0.135 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.746) (0.946)     
Government Effectiveness (GE) --- --- 38.184*** 8.231*** --- --- 
   (0.000) (0.006)   
Economic Governance (Ecogov) --- --- --- --- 2.904* 2.516* 
     (0.071) (0.056) 
Capital Flight (-1)(CapFlight) -0.258 -0.259 -3.466*** -0.822*** -0.181 -0.500** 
 (0.480) (0.307) (0.000) (0.004) (0.602) (0.027) 
RG ×CapFlight -0.120 -0.127 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.637) (0.511)     
GE× CapFlight --- --- -3.824*** -0.994*** --- --- 
   (0.000) (0.001)   
Ecogov× CapFlight --- --- --- --- -0.301* -0.325** 
     (0.073) (0.016) 
Trade  0.023** 0.027*** 0.014 0.019*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
 (0.014) (0.000) (0.217) (0.001) (0.007) (0.000) 
Domestic Investment  -0.023 -0.002 -0.033* -0.009 -0.023 -0.019** 
 (0.147) (0.772) (0.091) (0.177) (0.273) (0.016) 
Population   --- 0.0009 --- -0.005** --- 0.002 
  (0.848)  (0.045)  (0.517) 
Bank Efficiency --- -0.038*** --- -0.032*** --- -0.033*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Private credit  --- 0.085*** --- 0.074*** --- 0.087*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Net Effects of Capital Flight na na -0.884 -0.151 na -0. 531 
       
AR(1) (0.267) (0.082) (0.270) (0.078) (0.261) (0.078) 
AR(2) (0.293) (0.348) (0.304) (0.361) (0.289) (0.322) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.510) (0.795) (0.321) (0.737) (0.656) (0.769) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.498) (0.303) (0.316) (0.813) (0.605) (0.808) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.457) (0.921) (0.353) (0.544) (0.567) (0.592) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.335) (0.808) (0.539) (0.557) (0.719) (0.669) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.890) (0.411) (0.103) (1.000) (0.317) (0.811) 
       
Fisher  417.99*** 481.48*** 99.04*** 302.18*** 145.96*** 1338.42*** 
Instruments  26 38 26 38 26 38 
Countries  35 35 35 35 35 35 
Observations  323 307 322 306 322 306 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure 
to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and 
Hansen OIR tests. The mean values of government effectiveness, regulation quality and economic governance are respectively -0.675, -
0.663 and 0.098. It is important to note that whereas the sample consists of 36 African countries, 35 countries may appear in the regression 
output because of issues in degrees of freedom associated with some variables used in the conditioning information set. na: not applicable 
because at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is not significant. 
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Table 4: Institutional governance, capital flight and industrialisation 
       
 Dependent variable: Industrialisation 
       
 Rule of Law   Corruption-Control  Institutional  Governance  
       
Industrialisation(-1) 0.822*** 0.960*** 0.772*** 0.872*** 0.794*** 0.911*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 8.551 2.123 18.086* 8.090** 3.393 6.160*** 
 (0.159) (0.441) (0.065) (0.030) (0.432) (0.002) 
Rule of Law  (RL) 7.499*** 2.802 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.072) (0.237)     
Corruption-Control (CC) --- --- 18.161** 5.989 --- --- 
   (0.047) (0.132)   
Institutional  Governance (Instgov) --- --- --- --- 3.028 4.174*** 
     (0.144) (0.001) 
Capital Flight (-1)(CapFlight) -0.618 -0.204 -1.511* -0.552 -0.217 -0.426** 
 (0.273) (0.498) (0.098) (0.138) (0.556) (0.025) 
RL × CapFlight -0.762* -0.415 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.066) (0.111)     
CC× CapFlight --- --- -1.807** -0.676 --- --- 
   (0.045) (0.100)   
Instgov× CapFlight --- --- --- --- -0.309 -0.495*** 
     (0.127) (0.000) 
Trade  0.004 0.009 -0.001 0.008* 0.023** 0.003 
 (0.586) (0.186) (0.904) (0.072) (0.030) (0.435) 
Domestic Investment  -0.032* -0.010 -0.018 -0.031*** -0.030 -0.014** 
 (0.058) (0.148) (0.358) (0.000) (0.102) (0.034) 
Population   --- -0.008** --- -0.011*** --- -0.012*** 
  (0.012)  (0.005)  (0.000) 
Bank Efficiency --- -0.037*** --- -0.037*** --- -0.033*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Private credit  --- 0.100*** --- 0.074*** --- 0.101*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Net Effects of Capital Flight na na -3.916 na na -0.423 
       
AR(1) (0.272) (0.080) (0.268) (0.085) (0.271) (0.086) 
AR(2) (0.298) (0.241) (0.291) (0.430) (0.298) (0.230) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.354) (0.644) (0.396) (0.674) (0.540) (0.591) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.536) (0.522) (0.644) (0.766) (0.711) (0.852) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.267) (0.615) (0.263) (0.495) (0.374) (0.345) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.357) (0.452) (0.398) (0.489) (0.550) (0.409) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.353) (1.000) (0.364) (1.000) (0.381) (1.000) 
       
Fisher  132.67*** 3538.10*** 124.32*** 2259.14*** 203.33*** 1690.12*** 
Instruments  26 38 26 38 26 38 
Countries  35 35 35 35 35 35 
Observations  323 307 322 306 322 306 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure 
to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan and 
Hansen OIR tests. The mean values of the rule of law, corruption-control and institutional governance are respectively -0.716, -0.598 and -
0.006. It is important to note that whereas the sample consists of 36 African countries, 35 countries may appear in the regression output 
because of issues in degrees of freedom associated with some variables used in the conditioning information set. na: not applicable because 
at least one estimated coefficient needed for the computation of net effects is not significant. 
 
For example, in the third column of Table 2, the unconditional and conditional effects of 
capital flight are respectively: -0.770 and -0.605, whereas the corresponding net effect of 
capital flight from the interaction with political stability is -0.376 (-0.770 + [-0.605×-
0.650])7. Therefore, despite the unconditional positive effect of political stability on 
                                                          
7
-0.650 is the mean value of political stability.  
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industrialisation of  5.158, political stability does not significantly dampen the negative 
effect of capital flight on industrialisation. It follows that in the light of findings pertaining 
to political stability, Hypotheses 1-2 are valid whereas Hypothesis 3 is invalid. Moreover, 
from the results disclosed in Tables 2-4, Hypotheses1-2 are consistently valid, whereas 
Hypothesis 3 is consistently invalid with respect to political stability, political governance, 
government effectiveness, economic governance, corruption-control and institutional 
governance. Most of the significant control variables display the expected signs.   
 
4.2 Discussion of results  
As emphasised in the introduction, to the best of our knowledge no study has focused on 
Hypothesis 3: the role of governance (i.e. as a policy variable) in modulating the effect of 
capital flight on industrialisation. The validity of Hypotheses 1 and 2 is consistent with 
mainstream literature on the role of good governance and capital flight on industrialisation. 
This section is engaged in three main strands, notably: the consistency of the findings in the 
light of extant literature; some explanations as to why Hypothesis 3 is consistently invalid and 
caveats to the study. The three strands are expanded in chronological order. 
 First, on the one hand, the relevance of good governance in the promotion of 
industrialisation is consistent with a broad stream of macroeconomic- and industry-specific 
literature on the improvement of: structural transformation in the manufacturing sector 
(Mijiyawa, 2017); foreign direct investment (Rodriguez-Pose & Cols, 2017) and technology- 
driven exports (Asongu & Asongu, 2019), inter alia. On the other hand, the established 
unfavourable effect of capital flight on African industrialisation is broadly in line with a 
recent steam of literature on the relevance of capital flight in Africa’s development (Ndiaye 
& Siri, 2016; Mpenya et al., 2016; Gankou et al., 2016). 
 Second, the fact that Hypothesis 3 is not validated is an indication that governance is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition in the mitigation of the effect of capital flight on 
industrialisation. On the premise that knowledge-based economies are relevant in the drive 
towards industrialisation in the 21st century (Tchamyou, 2017; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2019; 
2020), the findings are consistent with Andrés et al. (2015), who have established that 
governance is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for knowledge-based economies in 
Africa. By extension, this inference also implies that governance standards need to be 
improved in order to better modulate capital flight and achieve net positive effects on 
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industrialisation. Policy actions that can be used to enhance good governance are discussed in 
the concluding section.  
Third, a caveat to this study is that there is homogeneity regarding the level of 
industrialisation of the 36 African countries, which may not be accurate. The issue can be 
corrected with the employment of dummy variables to differentiate the levels of 
industrialisation in the sample and/or disaggregation of the sample into fundamental 
characteristics (such as income levels) that are exogenous to industrialisation. Unfortunately, 
the introduction of dummy variables is theoretically and empirically inconsistent with the 
GMM approach because they represent country-specific effects that are eliminated by first 
differencing in order to avoid endogeneity resulting from a correlation between the lagged 
dependent variable and country-specific effects.  Two approaches have been used in order to 
account for heterogeneity in the levels of industrialisation, notably, (i) sub-sampling by 
income levels and levels of industrialisation and (ii) Quantile GMM regressions.  Both 
approaches produce biased estimated coefficients owing to instrument proliferation.  
The concern about instrument proliferation pertains to a situation in which after 
estimations, it is apparent from post-estimation diagnostic tests that the number of 
instruments in specifications is higher than the corresponding number of countries. While a 
procedure of dealing with the underlying concern of instrument proliferation consists of 
collapsing instruments, from the analysis in this study, the concern of instrument proliferation 
still persists even when the option of collapsing instruments is taken on board. It follows that, 
there is a choice between substantially accounting for heterogeneity and having estimated 
coefficients that are robust. This study preferred the latter for reasons that are inherently 
associated with caveats pertaining to the adopted methodology.  
 
5. Concluding implications and future research directions  
This study has investigated whether a potentially positive effect of governance on 
industrialisation mitigates a potentially negative impact of capital flight on industrialisation. 
The focus of the study is on 36 African countries for the period 1996-2010. The empirical 
evidence is based on Generalised Method of Moments. Three investigated hypothesis are 
examined, notably: governance increases industrialisation (Hypothesis 1); capital flight 
decreases industrialisation (Hypothesis 2) and the positive effect of governance dampens the 
negative effect of capital flight (Hypothesis 3). Governance is bundled by principal 
component analysis, namely: (i) political governance from political stability and “voice and 
accountability”; (ii) economic governance from government effectiveness and regulation 
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quality and (iii) institutional governance from corruption-control and the rule of law. The 
following findings are established: Hypotheses1-2 are consistently valid whereas Hypothesis 
3 is consistently invalid with respect to political stability, political governance, government 
effectiveness, economic governance, corruption-control and institutional governance.  
 The main policy implication is clear and straight forward: in order to boost ongoing 
industrialisation efforts in Africa, the governments of sampled countries would have to 
increase their efforts toward improving good governance in view of potentially mitigating the 
adverse effect that capital flight has on industrialisation. Actions aimed at promoting good 
governance should specifically be tailored towards limiting drivers of capital flight, notably: 
(i) political governance can stifle capital flight resulting from political instability and the 
absence of accountability; (ii) economic governance can reduce capital flight resulting from 
economic instability, imposition of capital controls, currency devaluation, government 
ineffectiveness and poor regulation quality and (iii) institutional governance can mitigate 
capital resulting from corruption and disrespect of the rule of law. Such governance 
mechanisms should entail improvements in, inter alia: participation; technical and 
managerial competence; transparency and open information systems, and organisational 
capacity. 
 Beyond policy implications, the scholarly contribution of this study also builds on the 
fact that we have shown that, in order to avoid conceptual conflation, perceptual bias and 
misleading policy inferences, the terminology used in identifying governance variables 
should be consistent with the measurement of the corresponding governance variables. For 
instance, Kangoye (2013) has employed “corruption-control” interchangeably with 
“governance”. Furthermore, the notions of political governance, economic governance and 
institutional governance have been employed in the literature without statistical validity 
(Kurtz & Schrank, 2007a, 2007b; Kaufmann et al., 2007a, 2007b). Hence, in the light of the 
established findings, the term “economic governance” cannot be employed unless it is a 
composite measurement of government effectiveness and regulation quality. We have also 
shown that a dimension of governance may be driven exclusively by one of its components. 
Moreover, our findings have complemented recent capital flight literature which has largely 
focused on: the relationship between capital flight and natural resources in Cameroon 
(Mpenya et al., 2016); the relationship between capital flight and fiscal policy (Muchai & 
Muchai, 2016); drivers of capital flight in Ethiopia (Geda & Yimer, 2016) and Madagascar 
(Ramiandrisoa & Rakotomanana, 2016); linkages between capital flight and tax revenue in 
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Burkina Faso (Ndiaye & Siri, 2016); public social spending and capital flight in Congo-
Brazzaville (Moulemvo, 2016); trade misinvoicing and capital flight in Zimbabwe 
(Kwaramba et al., 2016) and lessons from case studies on the causes and consequences of 
capital flight (Ndikumana, 2016). 
 It is relevant to also clarify that the recommendation to boost good governance in 
order to mitigate capital flight and enhance industrialisation also builds on the fact that 
governance standards in Africa are comparatively low relative to other continents of the 
world. This is also apparent from the summary statistics in Appendix 2 in which, the mean 
values of governance dynamics are negative on the one hand and on the other hand, for the 
respective governance dynamics, the minimum negative values are higher than the 
corresponding maximum positive values. Hence, the unexpected findings can also be 
traceable to the inherent poor governance in the continent which is reflected in the negative 
skewness of the attendant governance dynamics.  
 Future research can focus on investigating the relevance of the established findings on 
industrialisation when the outcome variable is assessed throughout the conditional 
distribution of industrialisation. The motivation for this future research recommendation is 
that the role of governance in dampening capital flight in order to boost industrialisation may 
be contingent on existing levels of industrialisation. Moreover, it is worthwhile to assess if 
the established findings withstand empirical scrutiny when industry-specific governance 
indicators are involved.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Definitions of Variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables  (Measurements) Sources 
    
Industrialisation  Industria Manufacturing (ISICD) UNCTAD 
    
Capital flight Capf. Logarithm of Capital Flight (constant of 2010) Ndikumana 
&Boyce (2012) 
  
 
 
 
Political 
Stability  
 
PS 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as 
the perceptions of the likelihood that the government 
will be destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional 
and violent means, including domestic violence and 
terrorism”  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Voice & 
Accountability  
V&A “Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the 
extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government and to enjoy 
freedom of expression, freedom of association and a 
free media”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
  
 
 
Political 
Governance  
Polgov First Principal Component of Political Stability and 
Voice & Accountability. The process by which those in 
authority are selected and replaced. 
           PCA 
  
 
 
 
Government 
Effectiveness 
 
Gov. E 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the 
quality of public services, the quality and degree of 
independence from political pressures of the civil 
service, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of governments’ 
commitments to such policies”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Regulation  
Quality  
RQ “Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability 
of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic 
Governance  
Ecogov “First Principal Component of Government 
Effectiveness and Regulation Quality. The capacity of 
government to formulate and implement policies, and 
to deliver services”.  
              PCA 
    
 
Rule of Law  
 
RL 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Corruption-
Control  
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions 
of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and 
private interests”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
  
 
 
Institutional 
Governance  
Instgov First Principal Component of Rule of Law and 
Corruption-Control. The respect for citizens and the 
state of institutions  
that govern the interactions among them 
PCA 
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Bank Efficiency BcBd Bank credit to bank deposits (%) World Bank (WDI) 
  
 
 
Domestic Credit Domcred Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
  
 
 
Trade  Trade Exports and Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
  
 
 
Domestic 
Investment  
GFCF Gross fixed capital formation (including Acquisitions 
less disposals of valuables) (% of GDP) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Population  Pop Population (in millions) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators. PCA: Principal Component Analysis. UNCTAD: United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development. ISICD: International Standard Industrial Classification (Section D).  
 
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics (1996-2010) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Industrialisation  11.355 6.699 2.207 36.858 528 
Capital flight  9.934 0.784 6.816 12.333 417 
Political Stability -0.650 0.952 -2.986 1.188 432 
Voice & Accountability  -0.705 0.637 -1.885 0.932 432 
Political Governance  -0.098 1.243 -2.974 2.709 432 
Government Effectiveness  -0.675 0.547 -1.974 0.727 431 
Regulation Quality  -0.663 0.535 -2.412 0.791 432 
Economic Governance  0.098 1.146 -3.284 3.276 431 
Rule of Law -0.716 0.626 -2.207 0.773 432 
Control of Corruption  -0.598 0.562 -2.057 1.249 431 
Institutional Governance -0.006 1.287 -3.139 3.676 395 
Bank Efficiency  67.069 28.572 13.753 164.618 517 
Domestic Credit 16.596 15.036 0.198 103.632 511 
Trade Openness  69.974 39.783 0.000 225.043 540 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation  21.031 9.398 2.000 63.698 528 
Population  20.97 26.681 0.077 159.424 540 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.   
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Appendix 3: Correlation matrix (uniform sample size: 291) 
                 
Control variables Political governance Economic governance Institutional governance    
Pop GFCF Trade  Domcred BcBd PS VA Polgov GE RQ Ecogov RL CC Instgov Capfl. Industria  
                 
1.000 -0.300 -0.288 0.159 -0.032 -0.313 -0.132 -0.247 -0.098 -0.132 -0.120 -0.115 -0.226 -0.177 0.420 -0.215 Pop 
 1.000 0.382 0.200 -0.169 0.442 0.375 0.443 0.447 0.411 0.450 0.532 0.464 0.516 -0.028 -0.214 GFCF 
  1.000 0.033 -0.159 0.336 0.094 0.241 0.150 0.062 0.112 0.179 0.241 0.218 -0.128 0.175 Trade 
   1.000 0.406 0.282 0.105 0.215 0.539 0.328 0.456 0.457 0.425 0.457 0.132 0.250 Domcred 
    1.000 -0.049 -0.155 -0.106 0.040 0.074 0.059 -0.076 0.036 -0.019 -0.086 0.239 BcBd 
     1.000 0.724 0.938 0.715 0.683 0.732 0.801 0.743 0.801 -0.138 0.088 PS 
      1.000 0.917 0.665 0.667 0.697 0.737 0.696 0.743 -0.074 -0.196 VA 
       1.000 0.744 0.727 0.771 0.831 0.776 0.833 -0.117 -0.047 Polgov 
        1.000 0.824 0.957 0.879 0.847 0.895 0.055 0.057 GE 
         1.000 0.952 0.834 0.745 0.818 0.159 0.069 RQ 
          1.000 0.897 0.835 0.898 0.110 0.066 Ecogov 
           1.000 0.857 0.963 0.040 0.036 RL 
            1.000 0.964 -0.073 0.130 CC 
             1.000 -0.018 0.087 Instgov 
              1.000 -0.063 Capfl. 
               1.000 Industria 
                 
Pop: Population. GFCF: Gross Fixed Capital Formation. Domcred: Domestic credit to the private sector. BcBd: Bank Credit to Bank Deposits.PS: Political Stability/Non-violence. VA: Voice & Accountability. 
Polgov: Political Governance. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation Quality. Ecogov: Economic Governance. CC: Corruption-Control.RL: Rule of Law. Instgov: Institutional Governance. Capfl: Capital 
Flight. Industria: Industralisation.  
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